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"MOMMY, WHERE IS HOME?": IMPUTING
PARENTAL IMMIGRATION STATUS AND
RESIDENCY FOR UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANT CHILDREN
JOHANNA
I.

K.P. DENNIS*

INTRODUCTION

Carlos was among the many undocumented children in the
United States. A native and citizen of Mexico, he entered the
United States illegally when he was five years old.1 Two years
later, his father was granted legal permanent resident (LPR)
status, but Carlos did not get LPR status until he was nineteen
years old.2 Two years after becoming a LPR, Carlos was arrested
for smuggling, placed into removal proceedings, and he faced
deportation back to Mexico.3 Unfortunately for Carlos, he did not
satisfy the requirements to obtain Cancellation of Removal, which
is a common form of discretionary relief available in removal
proceedings.4
For LPR Cancellation applicants, the applicant must have
five years of residence as a LPR, have seven years' physical
presence after admission to any status, and not have been
convicted of an Aggravated Felony.5
When Carlos applied for Cancellation, he was faced with the
problem that although he was physically present in the United
States and living with his parents for sixteen of his twenty-one
* Professor Dennis teaches courses in immigration law and intellectual
property law at Southern University Law Center. This Article was supported
by a Summer 2012 Research Grant from Southern University Law Center.
Professor Dennis would like to thank her family, Audrey P. Dennis-Townsend,
Robert L. Townsend, Kadeem P. Dennis, and Anthaea-Grace P. Dennis, for
their support, and her 2011-12 research assistants, Ariel V. Dixon and
Summer M. Miller, for their work in compiling data and analysis used in this
article. Part of this research was presented at the Socio-Legal Studies
Association 2012 Conference held at Leicester De Montfort Law School on
April 3-5, 2012, in Leicester, UK.
1. Appendix to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12a, Holder v.
Martinez Gutierrez, No. 10-1542 (2012) [hereinafter The Gutierrez Appendix].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 7a-9a, 18a.
4. Id. at 7a-9a (discussing Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
§ 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2010)).
5. INA § 240A(a).
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years, he had not had LPR status for five years, nor had he
accrued seven years of presence post-admission.6
The government argued that the time requirements for
Cancellation must be met using only the applicant's residence and
admission.7 Carlos argued that as an unemancipated minor living
with his parents, his father's dates of admission and grant of LPR
status should be imputed to him, which would render him eligible
for Cancellation. 8 Along with a case involving similar issues,
Carlos's case was heard in the U.S. Supreme Court in the October
2011 Term.9
This Article discusses whether the parent's time in residence
and date of admission (immigration status) should be imputed to
an unemancipated minor; the two recently decided U.S. Supreme
Court cases addressing this issue; the policy implications and
impact of an imputation rule on undocumented children; and the
impetus and potential vehicles for changing the status quo.
II. INTRODUCTION TO CARLOS AND DAMIEN
A tale of two immigrants formed the basis for the U.S.
Supreme Court's consideration of the newest wrinkle affecting
Cancellation of Removal.
Carlos Martinez Gutierrez, a native and citizen of Mexico,
applied for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Legal Permanent
Residents (LPR CoR).10 Carlos, born in 1983, came to the United
States illegally with his parents in 1989,11 when he was just five
years old. Carlos lived with his parents at all relevant times, and
in 1991, when he was seven years old, Carlos's father became a
LPR.12 Carlos did not receive his LPR status until 2003, when he
was nineteen years old and no longer a minor.13 Two years later,
he was detained following inspection and charged with alien1 4

6. See The Gutierrez Appendix, supra note 1, at 17a-27a.
7. See Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011
(2012) (Nos. 10-1542, 10-1543) [hereinafter Petitioner's Consolidated Merits
Brief].
8. Brief of Respondent at 40, 52-54, Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011
(2012) (No. 10-1542), 2011 WL 6325857 [hereinafter Martinez Gutierrez
Merits Briefl.
9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011
(2012) (No. 10-1542).
10. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)
(2010).
11. The Gutierrez Appendix, supra note 1, at 12a.
12. Id.
13.

Id.

14. "Alien" is used in the Immigration and Nationality Act to refer to any
individual who is not a U.S. citizen (USC). This term encompasses Legal
Permanent Residents as well as individuals without permanent status in the
United States.
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smuggling1 5 of three undocumented minor children.16 In removal
proceedings, Carlos applied for LPR CoR, and since Carlos himself
only had two years towards the five- and seven-year rules, relying
on Cuevas-Gaspar,the Immigration Judge (IJ) allowed imputation
of Carlos's father's time in residence and LPR status grant,17 thus
granting Carlos CoR in 2006. The government appealed the
determination that Carlos was statutorily eligible for CoR on this
basis to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). On September
29, 2006, the Board reversed, ruling that imputation was not
permissible to satisfy either the five- or seven-year requirements.' 8
On remand to the Immigration Court, Carlos's removal to Mexico
was ordered since he qualified for no other form of relief.19 Carlos
then appealed the removal order to the BIA, which affirmed on
January 24, 2008.20 Carlos further appealed to the Ninth Circuit,
arguing that imputation should be permitted. On January 24,
2011, that court held, consistent with its line of precedent ending
with Mercado-Zazueta, that imputation was allowed in CoR cases
to satisfy both the five- and seven-year requirements. 21
Like Carlos, Damien Antonio Sawyers, a native and citizen of
Jamaica, applied for LPR CoR. 22 Damien, born in 1980, came to
the United States as a LPR in October 1995 when he was fifteen
years old.23 Damien's mother had already been in the United
States for six years following her lawful entry.24 Damien was
initially served with a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings
based on a December 2005 conviction for criminal possession of a
controlled substance, cocaine, in the fourth degree. 25 He was
charged with being removable for illicit trafficking in a controlled
substance (an Aggravated Felony) 26 and having been convicted of
an offense "relating to a controlled substance other than a single
offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less
of marijuana." 27 After DHS withdrew the Aggravated Felony
charge, it added a conviction record for Damien's August 2002
15. INA § 212(a)(6)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) (2010).
16. The Gutierrez Appendix, supra note 1, at 18a.
17. Id. at 17a-27a.
18. See id. at 16a (noting the Board's reversal and order of removal).
19. See id. at 7a-9a (noting the IJ's unreported decision to order removal in
Dec. 2006).
20. See id. 5a-6a (noting the Board's decision to reaffirm its prior holding).
21. Martinez Gutierrez v. Holder, 411 F. App'x. 121, 122 (9th Cir. 2011).
22. Appendix to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10a, Holder v.
Sawyers, No. 10-1543 (2012) [hereinafter The Sawyers Appendix].
23. Id.
24. See Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012) (consolidated
with Holder v. Sawyers, No. 10-1543).
25. Id.
26. See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2010); INA
§ 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2010).
27. INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2010).
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conviction for "maintaining a dwelling for keeping a controlled
substance, specifically cocaine and marijuana."28 Damien then
asserted a claim to U.S. citizenship, which was rejected by the IJ.29
Damien then argued that the August 2002 conviction did not stop
the period of continuous lawful residence30 because it was possible
he was convicted for possession of less than thirty grams of
marijuana, which is an exception to the removability charge. 3 ' The
IJ rejected this argument because Damien was convicted based on
marijuana and cocaine, the latter for which there is no exception. 32
As a result, the IJ found Damien removable and that the August
2002 conviction stopped the period of lawful residence. 33 As of
August 2002, Damien only had six years and ten months of lawful
residence after being admitted as a LPR, and consequently he fell
short of the seven-year requirement and was statutorily ineligible
for CoR.3 4 It is undisputed that Damien met the five-year
requirement.3 5 Although argued in Damien's pretrial brief, the IJ's
decision did not address the issue of imputing Damien's mother's
period of lawful residence to fulfill his seven-year requirement. 36
Damien appealed to the BIA, and, on December 26, 2007, the
Board dismissed the appeal. The BIA found harmless the IJ's
failure to address the imputation issue because it was the agency's
position that imputation was not permitted under Escobar, by
which decision it considered itself bound because it came after the
37
Ninth Circuit's earlier decision in Cuevas-Gaspar.
Damien
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In its October 14, 2010 decision, the
court rejected the Board's reasoning that Escobar, not CuevasGaspar, controlled, indicating that the court rejected the
arguments made in Escobar in its later decision in Mercado-

28. The Sawyers Appendix, supra note 22, at 11a.
29. Id. at 12a.
30. INA § 240A(d)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(2) (2010) (stop-time rule).
31. The Sawyers Appendix, supra note 22 at 13a.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Sawyers, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012)
(No.10-1543) [hereinafter Sawyers Petition for Certiorari].
36. The Sawyers Appendix, supra note 22, at 6a.
37. See Gonzales v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007);
see also Nat'1 Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967 (2007) (discussing the appropriate deference in a similar situation); The
Sawyers Appendix, supra note 22, at 7a (stating "the Ninth Circuit held in
similar circumstances that it must give 'Chevron deference' to an agency's
statutory interpretation that conflicts with its own earlier interpretation," and
even when the court finds the "Board's interpretation of an ambiguous
provision to be "unreasonable," the court "found that ... it was required to
defer to the subsequent interpretation by this Board." The Sawyers Appendix,
supra note 22, at 7a.
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Zazueta,3 8 which permitted the imputation of parental time.39
Accordingly, the court remanded to the agency on an open record
to "make findings in the first instance regarding the residency of
[Damien's] mother and regarding whether [Damien] was a minor
residing with her" and "when imputation should start."40
Rehearing was denied on February 1, 2011.41
The government filed its petitions for certiorari in both cases
in the U.S. Supreme Court on June 23, 2011,42 and the Court
granted certiorari in both cases on September 27, 2011,
consolidating Martinez Gutierrez with SawyerS43 and allocating
joint oral argument time. Both cases were argued on January 18,
2012.44 In its May 2012 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the questions of whether a parent's years of lawful
permanent resident status and/or years of residence after lawful
admission could be imputed to an alien who resided with that
parent as an unemancipated minor, for the purpose of satisfying 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(1)'s five-year requirement and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a)(2)'s seven-year requirement, respectively. 45 These
questions implicate not only the meaning of "admission" and "legal
permanent resident" status, but also who is "the alien" entitled to
benefit therefrom.
The author contends that imputation of parental time in
residence and date of immigration status grant should be
permitted. The most compelling cases are those involving
individuals who were physically present in the U.S. as
unemancipated minors living with their LPR custodial parent
during the entire period sought to be imputed, and who as adults
with LPR status seek the benefit of their custodial parent's time in
residence andlor date of LPR status grant. The most likely person
to benefit from such a rule would be the individual who, like
Carlos, was brought to the U.S. as an undocumented immigrant
child, and who likely was not able to petition for immigration
status until adulthood. Any contrary rule will unfairly penalize
these children for the choices or ignorance of their parents as to
the children's immigration status.

38.

39.

Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 2009).
Sawyers v. Holder, 399 F. App'x 313, 314 (9th Cir. 2010).

40. Id.
41. The Sawyers Appendix, supra note 22, at 3a.
42. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 2; Sawyers Petition for
Certiorari, supra note 26, at 2; Petitioner's Consolidated Merits Brief, supra
note 7, at 2.
43. Petitioner's Consolidated Merits Brief, supra note 7, at 2.
44. Transcript of Oral Argument, Martinez Gutierrez (Nos. 10-1542, 101543) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument].
45. See Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2014-15.
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III. ADMISSION

A.

Generally

When an individual from a foreign country seeks permission
to enter the United States, either temporarily 46 or permanently, 47
that individual is generally said to be seeking admission. 48
Individuals seeking admission must demonstrate that they are not
inadmissible 49 under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
This admissibility/inadmissibility determination is triggered for
lawful entrants at time of inspection,50 anyone applying to adjust
their status,5 1 and lawful permanent residents in certain
enumerated situations, 52 including, inter alia, "absen[ce] from the
United States for a continuous period in excess of 180 days,"58 and
committing a criminal offense that triggers inadmissibility. 54 The
general inadmissibility bars are for certain criminal convictions,55
misrepresentations/fraud/prior illegal presence/prior removal,56
health issues,5 7 public charge,5 8 security/terrorism, 5 9 and other
miscellaneous categories. 60
Individuals who enter the United States by means other than
having been admitted after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer are said to have entered without inspection
(EWI), which triggers inadmissibility. 61 The most recent estimate
of the number of such uninspected individuals (unauthorized
immigrants) living in the United States approximates at 11.5
million (see Figure 1), of whom 1.35 million (or 12%) are estimated
to be minor children (see Table 1).

46. INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2010) (listing nonimmigrant
visas).
47. Permanent admission means being admitted for legal permanent
residence (or obtaining a "green card").
48. See INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2010); see also INA
§ 101(a)(13)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(B) (2010) (showing situations where
lawful entry does not count as admission).
49. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2010).
50. INA § 101(a)(13)(A).
51. INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2010).
52. INA § 101(a)(13)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2010).
53. INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)(C)(ii) (2010).
54. INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)(C)(v) (2010).
55. INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2) (2010).
56. INA § 212(a)(6), (9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6), (9).
57. INA § 212(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1).
58. INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4).
59. INA § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3).
60. INA § 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (documentation requirements);
INA § 212(a)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(8) (ineligibility for citizenship); INA §

212(a)(10), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10) (miscellaneous).
61. INA § 212(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6).
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62. Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the
(2012)
1,
DHS,
Figure
2011,
January
States:
United
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois illpe_2011.pdf
(bars for 2010 census were not diagonally shaded in original).
63. Id. Table 5 (modified from original by author).
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B. LBR Admission
While it is generally the case that an individual who comes to
the United States with the intention to permanently stay, but who
has not applied for and been approved as a LPR, is inadmissible, 64
dual intent or later-formed-intent are also possible. As such, a
person may come to the U.S. as a nonimmigrant, with the
intention to return to their home country at the end of their lawful
stay, and thereafter develop the intention to stay in the United
States. Thus, if an individual entered the United States lawfully in
a status other than as a LPR, he or she may be eligible to apply to
adjust (change) their status to become a lawful permanent
resident.65 The two most common pathways leading to legal
permanent residence are immigration through a qualifying family
relationship and employment-based immigration.66 One such
qualifying relationship is that between a U.S. citizen parent
(petitioner) and a noncitizen, non-LPR, foreign-born child
(beneficiary),67 which categorization allows the immediate
(without a wait for a visa number)6 8 immigration and/or
adjustment of status for the beneficiary.69 Another qualifying
relationship is that between a LPR parent and a noncitizen, nonLPR, foreign-born child. Unlike the previous category, this
categorization requires a wait for a visa number, which presently
runs at about a two-and-one-half year wait. 70 The tangible result
64. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
65. INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255.
CITIZENSHIP AND
66. Green Card (Permanent Residence), U.S.
IMMIGRATION
SERVS.,
7 4
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a 5
3f6dla/?vgnextoid=ae853adl5c67321OVgnVCM100000082ca6OaRCRD&vgnex
(last updated
tchannel=ae853adl5c67321OVgnVCM100000082ca6OaRCRD
May 13, 2011).
67. Immediate Relative classification includes child, spouse, and parent of
USC, and permits immigration to U.S. as a legal permanent resident or
adjustment of status for a person already in the U.S. to LPR status.
68. "Immediate" means the petitioner and beneficiary can immediately file
the form applying to adjust status to LPR. In effect, the form demonstrating
the qualifying relationship (1-130) is filed at the same time as the form
applying to adjust status (1-485).
69. Green Card Through Family, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a754
3f6dla/?vgnextoid=4c2515d27cf7321OVgnVCM100000082ca6OaRCRD&vgnext
channel=4c2515d27cf7321OVgnVCM100000082ca6OaRCRD (last updated May
13, 2011).
70. See June 2012 Visa Bulletin, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2 (2012)
(showing
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/visabulletin/visabulletin June2012.pdf
January 1, 2010 chargeability date for Family Preference 2A category, which
amounts to a two-year-and-five-month wait between approval of the form
demonstrating the qualifying relationship and eligibility to file the form to
adjust status to LPR).
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of obtaining LPR status is a card known as the "green card," so
named for its original color,71 valid for ten years, 72 and renewable
indefinitely.78 Generally, after five years of LPR status, an
individual is eligible to apply to naturalize and become a U.S.
citizen,7 4 although there is no requirement that he or she do so. As
of 2010, there were approximately 12.5 million LPRs, of whom
two-thirds were eligible to naturalize and one-third was not
eligible.7 5 Unlike U.S. citizenship however, LPR status does not
shelter an individual from being asked to leave (or forcibly
removed from) the United States based on criminal activity76 or
another valid reason.7 7 Thus, in effect two-thirds of all LPRs in the
United States have an available guarantee of non-removal of
which they have chosen not to avail themselves.
IV. REMOVABILITY BASED ON A CRIMINAL CONVICTION
In addition to LPRs, all non-LPRs are potentially removable if
they engage in certain enumerated activities. 78 In 2010, 516,992
deportable aliens were located as a result of Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) enforcement operations, 79 of which
427,940 were of Mexican nationality.8 0 As compared to in 2001,
this represents a 63% decrease in the number of deportable aliens
who have been located in enforcement operations by DHS, or its
predecessor, INS.81 In contrast to the decline in the number of
71. Recently issued green cards are once again green in color, after having
been beige for a number of years.
72. With the exception of individuals who obtain conditional LPR status
based on marriage to a USC and obtaining LPR status within two years of the
date of the marriage.
73. See Green Card (PermanentResidence), supra note 66; Renew a Green
Card,
U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a754
3f6dla/?vgnextoid=8ae33a41070832 1OVgnVCM100000082ca6OaRCRD&vgnex
(last updated
tchannel=8ae33a4lO7O8321OVgnVCM100000082ca6OaRCRD
March 23, 2011).
74. Some exceptions are for spouses of USCs and VAWA applicants, who
are eligible to apply to naturalize after three years. INA § 319, 8 U.S.C. § 1430
(2010) (also providing for other exceptions).
75. Size of the Legal Permanent Resident Population,DHS, Table 1 (2011),
2
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_1pr-pe_ 010.pdf
to
were
eligible
8,070,000
of
which
(in 2010, there were 12,630,000 LPRs,
naturalize and 4,570,000 were not eligible to naturalize).
76. INA § 237(a)(2).
77. INA § 237.
78. See id. §§ 212, 237 (listing the enumerated activities that could lead to
deportation).
79. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
Table 33, at 91, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/
yearbook/2010/ois.yb_2010.pdf [hereafter DHS-2010 Yearbook].
80. Id.
81. Id.
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deportable aliens being located, with the exception of the 2009
fiscal year, 82 2010 saw the most removals ever reported from 1892
to present. Furthermore, there has been a steady increase in the
number of removals since 1997, coinciding with the passage of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA). In 2010, 387,242 aliens were removed pursuant to
an order of removal, and 476,405 aliens were returned (moved out
of the United States not pursuant to an order of removal). 83 Of
these, 282,003 (73%) and 354,982 (75%) were of Mexican
nationality, respectively. 84
Table 2

DEORMTAA1

TV ( 1%)

427.940 (%)

316,991

Aums
LOCATED

SV.42

A1=~3

474.4W

M~.M3

219J7I0

UZAM0

Min1l

114.M(75%;

LtX1

L475

U1

=3(-I%)

*Percentages fornatianalities indicate the percentage of the numbers in Column 1 (Total).

2010 Statistics
A broad spectrum of conduct can make an alien removable
from the United States either based on being inadmissible at time
of entry or at the point when the alien sought admission,85 or
deportable after having been admitted in a particular status.86
Only one of the many categories of either inadmissibility or
deportability is based on criminal conduct.87 As such, contrary to
what may be public perception and what may be depicted in the
media,8 8 only 44% of aliens who were removed in 2010 had
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. INA § 212.
86. Id. § 237.
87. Id. § 212(a)(2); INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2010).
88. See Alan Gomez and Kevin Johnson, Most illegal immigrants deported
TODAY,
Oct
18,
2011,
were
criminals,
USA
last
year
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-10-18/deportationscriminals-homeland-security/50807532/1; see also Dave Blount, Hundreds of
Deportable
Criminal
Aliens
Released,
RIGHT
WING
NEWS,
http://rightwingnews.comlimmigrationhundreds-of-deportable-criminalaliens-released/ (last accessed May 21, 2012) (showing the media depiction of
immigrants' criminal pasts).
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criminal convictions.89
V. CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL AS RELIEF FOR

LPRs

Many aliens who end up in removal proceedings are eligible
for relief from removal. Some forms of relief are based on how long
the alien has been in the United States and the family and
community ties he or she has formed here,90 while others are
based on humanitarian concerns.9 1 Not all forms of relief result in
the alien acquiring permanent statuS92 or even staying in the
United States; 93 sometimes the lesser evil is to leave the U.S.
voluntarily rather than be ordered removed. 94 In fiscal year (FY)
2011, only 73,493 (24%) of completed cases in immigration court
involved applications for relief.95 As such, unsurprisingly, 159,743
(70%) cases in immigration court resulted in either a removal
order or voluntary departure, meanwhile 67,810 (30%) cases
resulted in the alien staying in the United States (either by relief,
termination of proceedings by ICE, or administrative closure of the
case).96 Unfortunately, aliens who ultimately receive relief from
removal generally wait more than twice as long (on average over
seven hundred days)97 as compared to the national average
pendency of all removal cases,98 and more than four times as long
as compared to the national average pendency where a removal

89. DHS-2010 Yearbook, supra note 79, Table 33, at 91.
90. For example, through Cancellation of Removal.
91. Examples include Asylum, Convention Against Torture, Withholding of
Removal, Temporary Protected Status (TPS), Deferred Enforced Departure
(DED).
92. Withholding of Removal does not yield a green card. Neither does TPS
or DED.
93. An example would be Voluntary Departure.
94. INA § 212(a)(9). If an individual is ordered removed, he or she usually
faces a multi-year bar to applying for re-admission (ten or twenty years), by
contrast to the three-year bar for an individual who had not accumulated one
year of unlawful presence and who voluntarily left the U.S.
95. FY 2011 Statistical Yearbook, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION
REVIEW,
Ni
(2012),
EOIR-2011
[hereinafter
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fyllsyb.pdf
Yearbook].
96. U.S. Deportation Outcomes by Charge: Completed Cases in
IMMIGRATION,
TRAC
Courts,
Immigration
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court-backlog/deport
outcome .charge.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
97. As of March 28, 2012, the national immigration court processing time
was 781 days in cases where relief was granted. See Immigration Court
Processing
Time
by
Outcome,
TRAC
IMMIGRATION,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court backlog/
court-proctime outcome.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
98. Id. (indicating 374 days as national immigration court processing time
for all cases, as of March 28, 2012).
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order is entered.9 9 It is no surprise then that so many aliens choose
to abandon their applications for relief, rather than be in
immigration status limbo and/or detained for what can amount to
more than two years.
Even with such bleak outcomes, LPRs in removal proceedings
are wise to apply for a discretionary form of relief called
Cancellation of Removal (CoR or Cancellation). 100 Requirements
are less strict for LPR applicants, 101 who have demonstrably
stronger ties to the United States than those who are not
permanent residents. The major categorical bar to Cancellation for
LPRs is a conviction for an Aggravated Felony,102 which renders
LPR aliens ineligible for Cancellation.103 The only other
requirements are that the alien must have "been an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years," 0 4 and
that the alien has "resided in the United States continuously for 7
years after having been admitted in any status." 0 5 In contrast, an
alien who is not a LPR and who seeks Cancellation has a higher
hurdle to cross, perhaps because if that alien receives
Cancellation, he also becomes eligible to adjust status and become
a LPR.106 A non-LPR alien applying for CoR must not only show
ten years of physical presence immediately preceding the date of
the application, but also "good moral character during such
period," no convictions that would have made him inadmissible or
removable, and the substantial hurdle of "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" to a qualifying relative 07 as a result
of the alien's removal. 0 8 In order to be granted either form of CoR,
the alien must first demonstrate that he is statutorily eligible for
the relief by carrying his burden of showing that the requirements
for LPR, CoR, or non-LPR CoR is met.'09 Thereafter, the alien
must demonstrate that he warrants a favorable exercise of the
Attorney General's"o discretion."'
99. Id. (indicating 188 days as national immigration court processing time
for all cases, as of March 28, 2012).
100. INA § 240(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2010).
101. Id.
102. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2010).
103. INA § 240A(a)(3).
104. Id. § 240A(a)(1).
105. INA § 240A(a)(2).
106. Id. § 240A(a)(1).
107. A qualifying relative is "the alien's spouse, parent, or child" and such
individual must be a USC or a LPR. INA § 240A(b)(1)(D).
108. Id. § 240A(b)(1)(A)-(D).
109. See In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 10 (BIA 1998); INA
§ 240A(c)(4)(a)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (discussing the criteria for relief).
110. In removal proceedings, the IJ is the decisionmaker, not the actual
Attorney General, though the IJs are appointed officials under the
Department of Justice, Executive Office of Immigration Review.
111. See C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7 at 10 (discussing the criteria for relief).
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For both groups of aliens, LPRs and non-LPRs, the period of
continuous physical presence is tolled at the earlier of either the
service of the notice to appear in Immigration Court or when the
alien commits an offense that renders him or her inadmissible or
removable under the INA. Before the passage of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), LPRs could seek relief in section 212(c), which provided
that "aliens legally admitted for permanent residence" who
voluntarily went temporarily abroad and could be admitted to the
U.S., so long as they were returning to "a lawful unrelinquished
domicile of seven consecutive years," and they were not under
order of deportation or "convicted of one or more aggravated
felonies" for which they had served "a term of imprisonment of at
least 5 years."112
While the number of LPRs who may receive relief under CoR
or former section 212(c) is not restricted, there is an annual cap of
4,000 on the number of grants for non-LPR CoR or its predecessor,
suspension of deportation."'s Notwithstanding the fact that there
is no statutory restriction on annual grants of CoR/212(c) relief for
LPRs, the number of grants over the 2006-10 period has
consistently hovered around 4,000.114 In FY 2011, of the 303,287
cases that were completed,115 LPR CoR or its predecessor relief,
section 212(c), was granted in 4,886 cases.1 6 Meanwhile non-LPR
CoR or its predecessor relief, suspension of deportation, was
granted in 4,371 cases (of which 3,937 were subject to the 4,000
annual cap), for a combined CoR grant in 9,257 cases (or 3% of all
completed cases).117 At present, Cancellation of Removal is not a
floodgate of relief for aliens-be they LPRs or non-LPRs.
VI. THE MEANING OF "RESIDENCE"
Turning back to Carlos and Damien's pleas for immigration
mercy, their eligibility for CoR depends on whether they can
demonstrate that they satisfied the residence and physical
presence requirements. Their abilities to do so, thus, depend on
the precise meaning on the relevant terms.
In cases of statutory analysis, the necessary inquiry begins
with the language of the statute.118 As immigration law involves

112. INA § 212(c), U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1995) (repealed 1996).
113. The annual cap limits the number of aliens whose removal may be
cancelled and status may be adjusted. Since LPR Cancellation applicants are
not in need of an adjustment of status, the cap does not apply to them. INA
§ 240A(e)(1).
114. EOIR-2011 Yearbook, supra note 96, at R3 - Table 16.
115. Id. at Nl.
116. Id. at R3 - Table 16.
117. Id.
118. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (stating,
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applications of statutory provisions by administrative agencies,
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
provides the relevant deferential standard.119 Chevron's two-step
analysis first requires a determination of whether the statute's
language clearly addresses the issue. 120 If the statute clearly
indicates Congress's intent, the inquiry ends there. 121 Both the
agency and the courts "must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." 122 Second, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous regarding the issue, then the court should afford
deference to an agency's interpretation that is reasonable and
"based on a permissible construction of the statute."123 As to
decisions involving Cancellation of Removal, the relevant language
pertains to the meaning of "resided" in the statute, 124 and whether
the statute's reference to "the alien" 125 necessarily precludes a
custodial parent from satisfying the requirements on behalf of his
or her minor child.
Prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, CoR relief was afforded by
way of a 212(c) waiver.126 That statute provided for relief from
removal when certain criteria were met, with the most relevant
criterion being a seven-year period of unrelinquished "domicile."1 27
The statutory definition of domicile included the intent to remain
in a particular place. Since minors are legally incapable of forming
[a]s in all statutory construction cases, we begin with the language of
the statute. The first step "is to determine whether the language at
issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the
particular dispute in the case." The inquiry ceases "if the statutory
language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent."
(quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337(1997))).
119. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984) (discussing the proper deference to agency heads).
120. Id. at 842.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 842-43.
123. Id. at 843.
124. INA § 240A(a).
125. Id.
126. Id. § 212(c). The text of that section in full was:
(c) Nonapplicability of subsection (a)
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily
proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and
who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven
consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney
General without regard to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section
(other than paragraphs (3) and (9)(C)). Nothing contained in this
subsection shall limit the authority of the Attorney General to exercise
the discretion vested in him under section 1181(b) of this title. The first
sentence of this subsection shall not apply to an alien who has been
convicted of one or more aggravated felonies and has served for such
felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years.
127. Id.
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intent, a minor either had no place of domicile or was determined
to share the domiciliary of his or her custodial parent. 128 When
Congress changed the statutory relief to CoR, and removed
"domicile" replacing it instead with the concept of "residence," two
divergent positions as to its meaning emerged. One is that the
meaning of "residence" is clear, as it is defined in the INA as being
the "principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to
intent." 29 Thus, a child is legally capable of having a residence
distinct from that of his or her parents. Alternatively, it may be
argued that the meaning of "residence" is also clear, albeit with a
different result, in that the legislative history surrounding the
enactment of the CoR provisions and the change from "domicile" to
"residence" was not for the purpose of removing intent from the
equation. Instead, according to the history of courts' and agency
interpretation of the CoR provisions, the change was made to
bring the statute in line with other INA provisions and to resolve
the issue of whether the entire seven years had to come after the
LPR status grant. 130 Unfortunately, both "clear" interpretations
cannot coexist, and the fact that two diametrically opposed
positions can be argued for the meaning of the same term suggests
that term to be ambiguous and not at all clear.
By contrast, the meaning of "the alien" should be more easily
discernible, in that it relates only to the specific singular
individual. However, the language "an alien" and "aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence" as used in 212(c) are arguably
similarly narrow in scope, yet imputation was permissible based
on the overlay of domicile and intent. Thus, the fact that "the
alien" in CoR does not explicitly include the parent does not
necessarily exclude that parent from helping the minor child to
meet the statutory requirements. As such, given the history of the
intended scope and beneficiary of CoR, the term "the alien" has
murky meaning. If this is the case, then Chevron's second step
128. See Rosario v. INS, 962 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir. 1992); Lepe-Guitron v.
INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1024-26 (9th Cir. 1994); Morel v. INS, 90 F.3d 833, 840-42
(1996), vacated on other grounds, 144 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that a
minor shares domiciliary with his or her parents, "since most children are
presumed not legally capable of forming the requisite intent to establish their
own domicile.")
129. INA § 101(a)(33); see also In re Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 231, 233 (BIA
2007) (determining the definition of residence).
130. See Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2005)
(noting that "neither the language of the statute nor the legislative reports
provide any insight into why Congress changed the residency requirement
from the 'lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years' under
former § 212(c) to the two-part requirement [implicating "residence" under
§ [240A(a)]," and resolving the issue of whether the "alien could count a period
spent in non-permanent status toward a total period of residence of seven
years" by Congress creating two separate time requirements in section
240A(a)).
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requires an evaluation of the reasonableness of the agency's
construction of the statute.
A. Ninth Circuit v. BL4
Over the years, the BIA and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals have gone back and forth about the meaning of the
language in the CoR statute and whether the language permits
imputation of parental time for either the five- or seven-year
requirements. Generally, the BIA has indicated that imputation is
not permissible under the current statute for either time
requirement, while the Ninth Circuit has held that imputation is
allowed. The back and forth between the agency and the court is
significant, and it helps set the stage for the discussion of the issue
in other circuits and later in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Commencing with Lepe-Guitron v. INS, which involved the
predecessor 212(c) statute, the Ninth Circuit held that since a
child's domiciliary follows that of her parent, a parent's domicile is
imputed to an unemancipated minor child for the purposes of
212(c)'s domicile requirement. 13 1 The court reasoned that the
purpose of § 212(c) was to "provide relief from deportation for
those who have lawfully formed strong ties to the United
States," 32 and "section 212(c)'s core policy concerns would be
directly frustrated by the government's proposal to ignore the
parent's domicile in determining that of the child"'13 3 because
"children naturally form the strongest ties to the place where their
parents are domiciled."134 The court recognized that "a child's
domicile follows that of his or her parents . . . because children are,

legally speaking, incapable of forming the necessary intent to
remain indefinitely in a particular place."135 Finally, the court
noted that children are generally aggregated with their parents in
immigration law, citing as examples the assignment of priority
date and preference category in family-based immigration.136
Thereafter, directly addressing imputation for post-IIRIRA's
CoR, in Cuevas-Gasparv. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit held that an
alien who lived as an unemancipated minor with his or her LPR
parent could seek the benefit of the parent's period of continuous
residence after having been admitted in any status (the seven-year
requirement)." 7 The court recognized that immigration law is
"replete with provisions 'giving a high priority to the relation
between permanent resident parents and their children"' and
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Lepe-Guitron, 16 F.3d at 1025-26.
Id. at 1025.
Id.
Id.
Id.

136. Id.
137.

Cuevas-Gaspar,430 F.3d at 1029.
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"both the BIA and [the Ninth Circuit] repeatedly have held that a
parent's status, intent, or state of mind is imputed to the parent's
unemancipated minor child in many areas of immigration law,
including asylum, grounds of inadmissibility, and legal residency
status." 3 8 Cuevas-Gasparthus determined that the BIA's refusal
to permit imputation for CoR purposes conflicted with the agency's
prior "consistent willingness to impute a parent's intent, state of
mind, and status to a child,"139 and it "afford[edl less deference to
the BIA's interpretation."140 While noting that § 212(c) and
§ 240b(a) use different terms, the court determined that the
"difference between 'domicile' and residence 'after having been
admitted in any status' is not 'so great as to be dispositive.""' The
court further noted that "admitted" in § 240b(a)(2) did not bar
imputation by "requiring entry with inspection and authorization,"
because to do so would "in effect be requiring of legal permanent
residents more than the statute requires of non-permanent
residents, [(mere physical presence, regardless of admission 42)],
thus frustrating Congress's well-established policy of affording
aliens with legal permanent resident status more benefits than
non-permanent residents under the INA."143
Subsequently, in Escobar, the BIA rejected the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Cuevas-Gaspar and declined to extend that
decision's holding regarding permissible imputation as to the
seven-year rule to allow imputation to meet the five-year rule.144
The agency based its decision on the reasoning that "domicile"
from section 212(c) is different from "residence" in CoR, since the
latter contains no element of intent, the change from one term to
the other is significant, and imputation is improper.145 The agency
further reasoned that the Cuevas-Gaspar court's rationale
regarding how long a child has lived with a parent and the effect
on residency was inapplicable to the critical question of how long
the child had been lawfully accorded the status of a permanent
resident, because the child's status is severable from the
parent's.146

Subsequently, in Escobar, the BIA rejected the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Cuevas-Gaspar and declined to extend that
decision's holding regarding permissible imputation as to the
138. Id. at 1024.
139. Id. at 1026.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. INA § 240A(b)(1)(A).
143. Cuevas-Gaspar,430 F.3d at 1028.
144. See generally Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 231 (declining to extend the
holding of the Ninth Circuit in Cuevas-Gaspar).
145. Id. at 233 (stating "we find that residence is different from domicile
because it 'contains no element of subjective intent"').
146. Cuevas-Gaspar,430 F.3d at 1028.
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seven-year rule to allow imputation to meet the five-year rule. 147
The agency based its decision on the reasoning that "domicile"
from section 212(c) is different from "residence" in CoR, since the
latter contains no element of intent, the change from one term to
the other is significant, and imputation is improper. 148 The agency
further reasoned that the Cuevas-Gaspar court's rationale
regarding how long a child has lived with a parent and the effect
on residency was inapplicable to the critical question of how long
the child had been lawfully accorded the status of a permanent
resident, since the child's status is severable from the parent's. 149
This decision was then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which
reversed the BIA decision, ruling that imputation was permissible
for the five-year rule as well.' 5 0 However, in the meantime, the
BIA had reopened its case on Respondent's motion to suppress,151
such that by the time the Ninth Circuit decided the appeal, the
issue was moot. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated its
decision. 152
In the interim, since the BIA had rejected the Ninth Circuit's
ruling on imputation to meet the seven-year requirement, it came
as no surprise that the agency similarly refused to allow
imputation as to the same requirement in the next case where it
5 3 There, the BIA
was faced with that question: Ramirez-Vargas.1
found solace in Brand X,154 as its justification for its ability to
reach a result contrary to that articulated in a previous U.S. Court
5 5 Thereafter, the BIA
of Appeals case (here, Cuevas-Gaspar).1
156
decided Carlos and Damien's cases,
unsurprisingly ruling
against imputation to satisfy both the five- and seven-year
5 7 the Ninth
requirements. Subsequently, in Mercado-Zazueta,1
Circuit rejected the BIA's restrictive interpretation of CuevasGaspar and its reasoning based on Brand X15 8 and permitted
imputation to meet the five-year rule, which decision essentially
147. See generally In re Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 231. (declining to extend
the holding of the Ninth Circuit in Cuevas-Gaspar).
148. See id. at 233 (stating "we find that residence is different from domicile
because it 'contains no element of subjective intent').
149. Id. at 234-35.
150. Escobar v. Holder, 567 F.3d 466, 478 (9th Cir. 2009).
151. Escobar v. Holder, 329 F. App'x 138 (9th Cir. 2009).
152. Escobar v. Holder, 572 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009).
153. In re Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 599 (BIA 2008).
154. Brand X, 545 U.S. 967.
155. Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 601.
156. The Sawyers Appendix, supra note 22; The Gutierrez Appendix, supra
note 1.
157. Mercado-Zazueta, 580 F.3d at 1111-13.
158. Id. at 1114-15 (stating that "neither Brand X nor Duran Gonzales [v.
DHS, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007)] suggests that an agency may resurrect a
statutory interpretation that a circuit court has foreclosed by rejecting it as
unreasonable at Chevron's second step.").
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resuscitated the court's analysis from its vacated Escobar
decision. 5 9 Continuing with its line of cases holding imputation
permissible, the Ninth Circuit then decided the cases at bar,
indicating that imputation should be allowedo6 0 and remanding to
the BIA to address CoR relief factoring in the imputation of
parental time for both the five- and seven-year requirements, as
relevant to each case.161
B. The Aftershock and Suggested Rule
Accordingly, the BIA has held steadfast to not allowing
imputation in CoR cases, even in the face of the series of decisions
in the Ninth Circuit ruling that imputation is permissible. The
BIA has repeatedly stated that it will not apply the imputation
rule outside of cases in the Ninth Circuit.162 The effect of this has
been to create a sharp divide in outcome in the three circuits (the
Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits) that have addressed imputation
in CoR cases.163 In the cornerstone of these cases, Augustin, the
Third Circuit rightfully denied imputation, as the individual
seeking imputation was not even in the United States, let alone
living with his LPR parents, during the period of time sought to be
imputed.16 4 Arguably, imputation for purposes of CoR should be
limited to cases involving a minor unemancipated child who lived
in the United States with his or her custodial parent who had LPR
status during the entire time that is sought to be imputed. There
is a crucial distinction between living outside the U.S. and seeking
to impute the in-country time of one of the child's parents, and
living in the U.S. with the parent whose time the child seeks to
impute. In the former scenario, the child is not in the physical
custody of the parent and she may not herself have had any legal
U.S. immigration status during the time sought to be imputed
159. Mercado-Zazueta, 580 F.3d at 1114-15.
160. As to the fact that the BIA acknowledges other provisions in the INA
where imputation is permitted, but refused to allow imputation as to CoR time
requirements, the court noted that "it is unreasonable to impute the
abandonment of permanent resident status while refusing to impute the
acquisition of such status under section 240A(a)." Id. at 1111.
161. Id. at 1110-11, 1113, 1115.
162. See, e.g., Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 235 (stating that the agency "will
also not follow that decision ([Cuevas-Gasparand the line of Ninth Circuit
cases permitting imputation]) in cases arising outside the jurisdiction of the
Ninth Circuit.").
163. See, e.g., Augustin v. Attorney Gen., 520 F.3d 264, 271-72 (3d Cir.
2008); Deus v. Holder, 591 F.3d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 2009); Mercado-Zazueta,
580 F.3d at 1112 (addressing imputation); see also Rosario, 962 F.2d at 222-25
(approving of imputation as to former 212(c)); Morel, 90 F.3d at 840-42.
164. See Augustin, 520 F.3d at 266-67 (involving an individual who came to
the U.S. as an unemancipated minor LPR and sought to benefit from his
father's date of LPR admission, which predated the child's entry to the U.S. by
six years, in order to satisfy LPR CoR's seven-year rule).
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(which at minimum she must have to be eligible for LPR CoR).165
Nor does she share the same "principal, actual dwelling place" 66
as her LPR parent. In cases where the unemancipated minor child
is not physically in the United States living under the same roof as
her LPR parent, and thus, the child's physical residence is
different from that of the parent, the child should not be able to
benefit from immigration relief, such as CoR, predicated on the
assumption that the beneficiary is physically present in the United
States at all relevant times.16 7
In addition, although the Third Circuit's precedent is
consistently cited as the baseline rationale for rejecting imputation
in practically all non-Ninth Circuit cases involving CoR and other
forms of relief, Augustin is distinguishable from cases in the other
circuits. The Third Circuit has not addressed the imputation issue
in a case involving CoR where the alien seeks to impute time from
when he or she was an unemancipated minor in the U.S. in the
custody of his or her LPR parent. Yet, even with facts
substantially different from those in Augustin,168 in the only CoR
case in the Fifth Circuit case involving imputation, the court
rejected the possibility of imputing time and/or date of admission,
based on it finding "persuasive the [admittedly distinguishable]
rationale of the Third Circuit in Augustin." 6 9 It appears that the
BIA's earlier statement of its rejection of an imputation rule

165. See infra Section VII (discussing why the child must, in effect, have
legal permanent resident status; what is being imputed is the date on which
that status became effective, not the status itself).
166. INA § 101(a)(33).
167. See Deus, 591 F.3d at 811 (stating that where an individual did not
actually dwell in the U.S. for the relevant time period,
the goal of maintaining relationships between legal permanent resident
parents and their minor children could not alone form the basis to find
[unreasonable] the BIA's unwillingness to read into the statute an
exception to the requirements for cancellation of removal for minors
whose parents precede them in immigrating to the United States.
(citing Augustin, 520 F.3d at 269-70)).
168. Id. (noting that Augustin's "decision may have rested in part on the
facts presented" and "Deus' facts are distinguishable from those in Augustin,
in that it appears that she did actually reside in the United States with her
legal permanent resident parent while a minor").
In Deus, the individual who entered the U.S. illegally as a one-year-old child
with her mother, who herself was granted LPR status on date of entry, and
eventually obtained LPR status at seventeen years old, but committed a
removable offense three years later, sought to impute time to satisfy LPR
CoR's seven-year requirement. Id. at 808. Arguably, if any factual scenario
was amenable to imputation, it is this one where the unemancipated minor
was literally an infant, incapable of objecting to the illegal entry and incapable
of presenting herself to the inspecting officer. The fact that the LPR parent
obtained that status on entry-the same entry as the child-and yet the child
had no status, makes the case for imputation even stronger.
169. Id. at 812.
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outside the Ninth Circuit 70 has had the effect of suggesting that
the agency will fight to its dying breath with any court that dares
to rule imputation permissible. The BIA essentially has told the
other circuits, "don't even try it, or you're in for a fight," and the
result has been rejection of the imputation rule in the circuits
outside the Ninth, even when the facts are substantially
distinguishable from Augustin and amenable to imputation.171
Further, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have justifiably rejected
imputation in cases involving temporary protected status,172 as in
those cases, allowing imputation would result in the grant of legal
status to someone who was not in the United States during the
relevant time. For example, in De Leon-Ochoa,173 the Third Circuit
refused to extend Cuevas-Gaspar's reasoning, permitting
imputation of parental time in residence, to "continuous residence"
for purposes of TPS eligibility. There, the court reaffirmed its
reasoning in Augustin for declining imputation. However, the
court's analysis regarding TPS can be distinguished from CoR,
since the "the TPS program was designed to shield aliens already
in the country from removal when a natural disaster or similar
occurrence has rendered removal unsafe." 74 Thus it logically
follows that imputation should not be applied in TPS cases, where
to do so would have the effect of "convert[ing] th[e] statute into a
program of entry for an alien."175 This is in stark contrast to CoR
for LPRs, which is intended as a broad category of relief for those
already in the country with legal permanent resident status.
More importantly, the application of an imputation rule to
CoR cases would not have the effect of permitting entry or legal
status for those who otherwise would not be allowed into the U.S.
post-Mercado-Zazueta cases in the Ninth Circuit where the
imputation rule has been applied have consistently involved aliens
who are not merely attempting to claim benefit of parental time in
residence or legal permanent resident status, but have been
physically present in the U.S., specifically as an unemancipated
minor living with that LPR parent, and at some point in time,
were granted legal permanent resident status themselves.176 The
170. Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 235 ("Inasmuch as we disagree with that
holding, we will also not follow that decision in cases arising outside the
jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.").
171. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68 (discussing the relevant
facts of Deus v. Holder).
172. See, e.g., De Leon-Ochoa v. Attorney Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 355 (3d Cir.
2010); Ramos Cervantes v. Holder, 597 F.3d 229, 236-37 (4th Cir. 2010)
(rejecting imputation of temporary protected status).
173. De Leon-Ochoa, 622 F.3d 341.
174. Id. at 353.
175. Id. at 354.
176. Compare Becerra v. Holder, 411 F. App'x 67 (9th Cir. 2011) (imputation
permitted), Castellanos-Garcia v. Holder, 391 F. App'x 592 (9th Cir. 2010)
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requirement that the individual applying for CoR for LPRs must
have his or her own green card is a cornerstone of the statute.
Therefore, as the court stated in Mercado-Zazueta, since both
Carlos and Damien have "actually

. . . been admitted for

permanent residence, it is beyond dispute that [they] ha[ve]
satisfied the substantive and procedural requirements of
admission for permanent residence."17 7 To impute either time in
residence or legal permanent resident status to these individuals
does not have the effect of making them eligible for admission or
legal resident status when they were not already adjudicated by
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (U.S.C.I.S.)
and afforded those benefits. Allowing imputation and restricting
the amount of time to be imputed to time when the child lived in
the United States with the LPR parent, only modifies the start
date of the five- and seven-year clocks, it does not grant the child
anymore legal status than he or she already has. In addition, these
time requirements were only "imposed to probe the duration of an
alien's lawful ties to the United States."1 78 In cases such as these,
where the individual requesting imputation has lived with their
LPR parent for substantial periods of time, the issue of ties to the
United States is moot.179 Ultimately, the suggested rule would be
to permit imputation in cases involving individuals who were
physically present in the U.S. as unemancipated minors living
with their LPR custodial parent during the entire period sought to
be imputed, and who as adults with LPR status seek the benefit of
their custodial parent's time in residence and/or date of LPR
status grant.
C. Arguments in Martinez Gutierrez and Sawyers
In Carlos and Damien's cases, a significant portion of the
government's argument rested on the fact that Congress changed

(same), and Mercado-Zazueta, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (same), with
Guardiano v. Holder, 411 F. App'x 74 (9th Cir. 2011) (imputation denied where
individual was not residing with the LPR parent), Hernandez Barron v.
Holder, 411 F. App'x 85 (9th Cir. 2011) (cannot impute time of LPR spouse),
Saucedo-Arevalo v. Holder, 636 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2011) (declining imputation
for non-LPR CoR in NACARA case where individual was not physically
present in U.S.), De Escobedo v. Holder, 400 F. App'x. 287 (9th Cir. 2010)
(cannot impute time of parent who is not LPR), and Ramos Barrios v. Holder,
567 F.3d 451, 581 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009) (declining imputation to meet
NACARA seven-year physical presence requirement where individual not
physically present in U.S.).
177. Mercado-Zazueta, 580 F.3d at 1110.
178. Id. (citing Cuevas-Gaspar,430 F.3d at 1028-29).
179. See id. at 1111 (noting "congressional policy of recognizing that
presence in the United States of an extended length gives rise to such strong
ties to the United States that removal would result in undue hardship"
(quoting Cuevas-Gaspar,430 F.3d at 1029)).
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the statutory language from domicile to residence. The Ninth
Circuit addressed imputation as to section 212(c), which involved
domicile, in Lepe-Guitron. In permitting imputation, the court
rejected the "BIA's interpretation of section 212(c), which would
require children to themselves obtain permanent resident status
before their lawful domicile could accrue."180 Yet, in the present
cases, the government made the identical argument that was
181
previously rejected by both Lepe-Guitron and Cuevas-Gaspar. In
its brief on the merits, the government's argument-in-chief was
primarily based on the statutory text and a plain reading of the
182
It
LPR CoR statute (INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)).
contended that since the statute refers in the singular to "the
alien" and his or her ability to meet the admission and period of
residence requirements, only time personally satisfied by the alien
may be considered. 183 The government further articulated that the
statute's failure to include a specific prohibition on imputation or
complete silence regarding imputation should not be interpreted to
permit imputation.18 4 Further, the government argued that the
absence of textual support for imputation is bolstered by absence
of congressional intent indicating support for imputation, and that
policy concerns for family unity may not override the statutory
text. In any event, the government advanced the position that the
Board's interpretation of the statutory provisions is reasonable
and entitled to Chevron deference.18 5 As such, regardless of any
contrary precedent, history of court broadening of the meaning of
the relevant terms using imputation, or policy reasons for
imputation, the government contended that the text and
legislative history dictated that the necessary outcome must be
against imputation of parental time. 186 The effect of the
government's argument is that children would need to seek out
and obtain their own permanent resident status, separate from
their parents, in order to start the clocks on the five- and sevenyear rules.18 7
180. Lepe-Guitron, 16 F.3d at 1026.
181. The Government's argument in chief focused on the plain meaning of
the statute and its legislative history. See Petitioner's Consolidated Merits
Brief, supra note 7, at 11-13.
182. Id. at III.
183. Id. at 16-17.
184. Id. at 20-21.
185. Id. at 33-39.
186. Id. at 24-33.
187. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 27:24 to 28:6
(noting by the attorney for Respondent Martinez Gutierrez that: "[T]he
requirements for which there is imputation, status and residency, are matters
that are not within the capacity or the control of a minor. A minor does not
decide whether or when a parent will apply for LPR status for him or her. He
does not control the-the maintenance of that status over a period of years,
and he also does not control where he resides.").
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Furthermore, it is significant that once Carlos's father
received his LPR status, Carlos became eligible for LPR status
also, even if Carlos had not been eligible to be listed as a
dependent on his father's adjustment application.188 If his father
had filed an 1-130 relative petition at this time, Carlos would have
been a family preference category 2A, which using the current
wait times, would have been a two-year-and-five-month wait for
an available visa.189 It is the family member with LPR status who
has to apply for the beneficiary (here, the child). The child cannot
file his or her own 1-130 application to start the process.19 0 Thus,
without Carlos's father (or later, possibly, his mother) initiating
the process, Carlos could not have received LPR status through
their family relationship. As such, for the government to take the
position of "blaming" the child for not "being admitted in any
status" and not having LPR status, triggering the start of the
seven- and five-year time periods, respectively, is ludicrous. 19'
By contrast, respondents Carlos and Damien argued that the
BIA's position was inconsistent with the agency's own acceptance
of imputation under similar statutes and with Congress's preexisting and unchanged intent, permitting imputation in section
212(c), and that a contrary rule would run afoul of CoR and section
212(c)'s "objectives of 'providing relief to aliens with strong ties to

188. See Petitioner's Consolidated Merits Brief, supra note 7, at 31-32 n.9
(showing examples of situations in which a LPR parent cannot immediately
get the same status for his or her spouse or child).
189. See June 2012 Visa Bulletin, supranote 70 (showing visa wait times).
190. The person filing the 1-130 is the petitioner, who is the U.S. citizen or
LPR asserting the familial relationship with the intended beneficiary. The
Form is appropriately titled "Petition for Alien Relative" (emphasis added) and
serves the purpose of being the form "[flor [a] citizen or lawful permanent
resident of the United States to establish the relationship to certain alien
relatives who wish to immigrate to the United States." 1-130 Form, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/ (last visited Aug.
4. 2012) (click on "Forms", then "Petition for Alien Relative").
The first part of the form indicates: "You are the petitioner. Your relative is
the beneficiary," and it continues by asking the petitioner to identify the
relationship to the beneficiary by completing the following sentence and
checking the appropriate relationship: "I am filing this petition for my:
Husband/Wife[,] Parent[,] Brother/Sister[,] Child." Id.
191. See also Mercado-Zazueta,580 F.3d at 1112-13 (stating it is "absurd to
penalize [the child] for his parents' failure to assist him with the adjustment
process" and
while unemancipated minors may be technically capable of attaining
lawful permanent resident status without their parents' assistance, it is
not reasonable to expect them to do so. The imputation of both domicile
and permanent resident status to minor children is appropriate, so far
as cancellation of removal is concerned, "precisely because the minor
either [is] legally incapable of satisfying one of these criteria or could not
reasonably be expected to satisfy it independent of his parents."
(quoting Barrios,567 F.3d at 463)).
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the United States' and 'promoting family unity'."192 Respondents
also argued that the BIA did not understand that it had discretion
to permit or deny imputation, wrongly believing that Congress's
silence translated into a rejection of imputation.193 Finally,
respondents heavily argued that since imputation was permitted
for "domicile," which included intent and was thus a stricter
requirement than the non-intent focused "residence", the latter,
more lenient term necessarily allowed imputation as well.19 4
Also, one amicus party, National Immigration Justice Center,
filed a merits brief in support of respondents, arguing, inter alia,
that the BIA should not be entitled to Chevron deference based on
its unique characteristics and history regarding unreasonable case
load and case turnover rate, and amount of reversals and
erroneous determinations.195
VII. THE WAY IT SHOULD BE
The author suggests that when a LPR in removal proceedings
seeks CoR, he or she should be able to benefit from their former (if
the LPR is now an adult) or current custodial parent's time in
residence and/or date of LPR status grant, when the individual
seeking imputation was physically present in the U.S. as an
unemancipated minor living with his or her LPR custodial parent
during the entire period to be imputed.
A.

Implicationsof Using the Real Admission Date

As discussed above, there are significant implications to using
only "the alien's" admission date and actual time in residence for
minor children. For children, who typically rely on their parents,
immigration status is inseparable from any other basic need the
child has, for which the parent provides. The parent is responsible
for providing the child with food, shelter, safety, and nurture, and
concomitant with this set is the security of lawful status and
protection from dislodgement from the child's home. A child should
not have to live in fear of deportation; this is especially so when
the child's parent has lawful status to which the child should

192. Martinez Gutierrez Merits Brief, supra note 8, at 40, 52-54; Brief for
Respondent at 13, 37, 41, Holder v. Sawyers, 2012 WL 2507513 (9th Cir. 2012)
(No. 10-1543), 2011 WL 6282150 [hereinafter Sawyers Merits Brief].
193. See Sawyers Merits Brief, supra note 192, at 38-39 (arguing for BIA's
discretion in imputation).
194. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 28:13 to 29:03, 33:12 to
34:02, 45:10 to 51:05.
195. See generally Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011
(2012) (No. 10-1542) and Sawyers, 2012 WL 2507513 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 101543), 2011 WL 6468696 (arguing that the BIA should not be entitled to
Chevron deference).
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derivatively benefit. Even if the child was not an eligible
derivative beneficiary at the time the parent filed for LPR status,
the child became an eligible beneficiary based on a familypreference category the moment her mother or father received the
green card. Unfortunately, in either case, the child relies on the
parent to initiate the paperwork necessary for her to obtain LPR
status. Often money is the primary reason for the delay in filing
the applications necessary for the child to receive her LPR status;
it is rarely because the parent does not want the child to benefit
from lawful status, nor because the child independently decides
that she does not want lawful status. As such, it is unfair to
penalize the child for a circumstance over which she had no
control. She could not anymore have applied for LPR status as she
could have taken a bus back to Mexico and re-enter the U.S. to
lawfully seek admission. With the Supreme Court's acceptance of
the government's position, relying on Chevron deference to pretend
that its hands were tied, the Court has clearly answered the pleas
of the millions of undocumented children in the U.S. When these
children ask "Mommy, are the men in the vans going to come get
us?" and "Daddy, will you protect me from them?" their mothers
and fathers should explain that the immigration officers may only
be coming for the child and that Mommy and Daddy have their
green card safety nets. When the child asks "Mommy, where is
home?", his mother should reply, "You don't have one until you can
file your own immigration petition and application. I cannot afford
to protect you."

B. Impact of the Suggested Imputation Rule on Non-LPR CoR
If imputation of parental time for LPRs is limited to
circumstances in which the minor child is physically present in the
U.S. living with a LPR parent, then there will be no effect on a
non-LPR CoR. This is because a non-LPR CoR already has a lower
threshold for its time requirement-"continuous physical
presence" regardless of status-than does its LPR counterpart. As
a result, to require the child's physical presence with the parent
whose time is sought to be imputed would result in the child him
or herself always meeting the continuous physical presence
requirement by mere fact of meeting the prerequisites for
imputation. Put another way, if the child must live with his parent
for the ten years for which the child wishes to benefit, then the
child simultaneously fulfilled his ten-year requirement of
continuous physical presence without the need to impute any of
his parent's time. If the child leaves the U.S. and thus has a break
in physical presence, then he also has a break in the time he lived
with his parent, and thus cannot seek benefit of the time while he
is away. As a result, non-LPR CoR cases will not be affected by
allowing imputation for LPRs.
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VIII. THE WAY IT IS RIGHT Now: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
RESOLUTION
At oral argument,196 the justices repeatedly expressed concern
whether a proposed imputation rule would benefit children who
were living with others (not their parents) or living outside the
United States.197 This suggested that the Justices were
considering the impact of imputation and the scope of such a rule.
However, in unanimously reversing the Ninth Circuit in both
cases, the Court held reasonable the BIA's interpretation of the
CoR rule (INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b) to deny imputation for
the five- and seven-year requirements. 198 The reasonableness of
the Board's decision however, only comes as the secondary
consideration-before which the Court must have determined that
the statute does not clearly evince Congress's intent. Accordingly,
by assessing whether the Board's construction of the statute is
reasonable, the Court impliedly held that the statute was silent or
ambiguous as to imputation.
One argument could be made that there was either clear
congressional intent to leave undisturbed the history of imputation
under section 212(c) or there was no clear intent to destroy the
availability of imputation, and that the change of language had a
separate and distinct purpose than to affect imputation. Yet, the
Court avoided addressing this Chevron first prong issue, skipping
to the second prong by indicating that "the Board's approach is
consistent with the statute's text" claiming that "respondents
tacitly concede[d]" this point.199 Stating that the statute is silent
as to imputation, a Chevron second prong issue, the court focused
on the meaning of "the alien," distinguishing it from "the alien or
one of his parents," suggesting that had Congress intended for the
former term to carry the meaning of the latter, it would have used
the latter language. However, this argument belies the fact that
former section 212(c) also used arguably narrow language,
referring to those eligible for a waiver as "[a]liens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence." Were the Court's reasoning
and the government's argument applied to this language, it would
necessarily exclude a child who himself was not a LPR from
qualifying for the 212(c) waiver. In section 212(c) cases, the basis
for permitting imputation was the meaning of domiciliary, and
had nothing to do with whether the child was an "alien[] lawfully
admitted for permanent residence." As such, there is more to the
196. The cases were argued on January 18, 2012, with respondents arguing
separately.
197. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 31-32, 38-39, 41-42, 44.
198. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2014-15.
199. Id. at 2017. The text of a statute is the primary clue to Congress's
intent. Thus, if the agency's interpretation is consistent with the text, usually
the agency's interpretation parallels congressional intent.
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story than simply the term used to describe the individual who has
applied for relief. However, given respondents' arguments,
consistent with this point, 200 the Court indicated that reliance on
imputation in former 212(c) and the lack of a clear statement by
Congress to eradicate it was unfounded since Congress did not
merely reenact section 212(c) "without relevant change."210
The Court also rejected respondents' arguments that "family
unity" would be thwarted, indicating that such are not the "INA's
only goals . . . pursue[d] . . . to the nth degree." 202 Further,
although recognizing other statutes where the BIA had imputed
"parental attributes" to children 203 even where those statutes are
silent as to imputation, the Court reasoned under Escobar that
"the Board imputes matters involving an alien's state of mind,
or
conditions
objective
impute
to
declining
while
characteristics." 204 Thus, the practical effect after the Court's
decision of Congress's change from INA 212(c)'s "domicile" (state of
mind) to "residence" (objective condition or characteristic) is to
remove the availability of imputation.
Finally, the Court rationalized the BIA's explanation that to
allow imputation in CoR cases would create administrative
anomalies, by "permitting even those who had not obtained LPR
status--or could not do so because of a criminal history-to
become eligible for [C]ancellation of [R]emoval." 205 This thinly
veiled justification by the BIA is without merit; CoR for LPRs is
only available to individuals who at time of application possess
their own LPR status. Had the Court allowed imputation of
parental time, all prospective beneficiaries would still need to be
LPRs in some capacity in order to apply for LPR CoR and the
Court's ruling could have been narrowly tailored to reflect that
fact, based not only on the BIA's concerns but on the differences
between CoR and other forms of relief or status grant.
The Court's rejection of the Ninth Circuit's imputation rule
and affirmation of the BIA's inflexible policy has grave
applicants,
cancellation
prospective
for
implications
200. Id. at 2017-18 ("[T]he Board's history of permitting imputation under
similarly 'silent' statutes supports this construction" and "none of this
language 'forecloses' imputation.").
201. Id. at 2018 ("[T]h[e] alteration" of the seven-year domicile rule to a
seven-year post-admission rule and five-year residence rule "dooms
respondents' position, because the doctrine of congressional ratification applies
only when Congress reenacts a statute without relevant change.").
202. Id. at 2019.
203. INA § 212(k), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(k) (2010) (permitting parent's knowledge
of inadmissibility or lack thereof to be imputable to child); INA § 211(b), 8
U.S.C. § 1181(b) (2010) (permitting parent's abandonment or nonabandonment of LPR status to be imputable to child).
204. Escobar,24 I & N Dec. at 233-34 n.4.
205. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2021.
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undocumented and newly documented children with LPR parents,
and immigration practitioners. Each individual, regardless of age,
emancipation, dependency, is a distinct person for purposes of
immigration status and admission. Similarly, under the Supreme
Court's recent ruling, a child or recently emancipated adult cannot
benefit from a parent's legal permanent resident status or lawful
admission apart from the parent actively transferring a benefit to
the child by way of family-based immigrant petition for LPR
status. If the LPR parent declines or is unable to do so, the fiveand seven-year clocks will not start until the child is admitted and
becomes a LPR, both of which may not occur until after the child
emancipates. Subsequently, if the recent adult is put in removal
proceedings unless he or she can independently satisfy the
requirements for relief from removal, he or she will be left without
recourse. Regardless of whether imputation is allowed in the
future, practitioners need to remind clients who are applying for
LPR status that they need to include any potential and eligible
dependents at the time of application; that they should file
petitions as soon as possible to start the five- and seven-year
clocks; and based on the current law, delaying or deferring the
application for a dependent impacts the start date for Cancellation
of Removal, if ever needed, because only the dependent's time and
status counts.
IX. Is THIS THE END OF THE ROAD?
A.

Congress and the Administration Have the Power to Change
Course

As with all statutory provisions, if Congress believes that the
judiciary has misinterpreted or misapplied the rule or intent
thereof, Congress is free to modify, clarify, or otherwise restate the
specific rule and contexts in which it should be applied. Similarly,
as the branches of the Department of Homeland Security are
charged with effecting admission and removal policies, the
Administration has the power to direct the agency's priorities and
guidelines. Given the effect that the Supreme Court's resolution of
Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez and Holder v. Sawyers will have on
legalized individuals who were undocumented as children, at
minimum, either Congress or the Administration needs to
explicitly provide an imputation rule or policy for CoR, and more
generally, Congress should resolve the "domicile" versus
"residence" issue as it relates to imputation.
Congress and the Obama Administration have already
demonstrated leniency and flexibility regarding undocumented
children, those who have great potential to contribute to U.S.
society, and those who are not dangerous threats to the country,
particularly individuals who have lived in the U.S. for practically
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their whole lives. 206 While all LPR CoR applicants likely have
criminal records, since they have done something to trigger their
removability, 207 this fact should not deter Congress from
permitting imputation, particularly for individuals who were
"brought to the US through no fault of their own as children."208
The CoR statute contemplates that LPRs seeking that form of
relief from removal will not necessarily have clean criminal
histories, and Congress has already decided that only LPRs who
have committed enumerated offenses labeled as Aggravated
FelonieS209 should be statutorily barred from CoR based on their
criminal history. Furthermore, if Congress and the Obama
Administration are willing to extend a temporary, but renewable
form of amnesty to undocumented young people, these lawmakers
should be even more so willing to permit relief from removal for
ex-undocumented young people; people like Carlos and Damien
who have substantially strong ties to the U.S. by nature not only
of how long they have lived here, but that they are LPRs. Further,
the suggested imputation rule is specific and narrow, and could be
206. See Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act
of 2009 & DREAM Act of 2010, H.R. 1751, H.R. 6327, H.R. 6497, S. 729, S.
3827, S. 3963, S. 3992, 111th Cong. (2009-10); Memorandum from John
Morton, Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), to All Field
Office Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, All Chief Counsel, (June 17,
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secureavailable
at
2011),
communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf (stating that Department
of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement resources
should be focused on deporting undocumented immigrants who are dangerous
criminals, over individuals with no criminal records, and ICE prosecuting
attorneys are permitted to exercise discretion by either dismissing or opting
not to prosecute cases warranting that discretion). This was not a "new" policy.
In fact, in June 2010, a memorandum from then Assistant Secretary Morton
cautioned ICE officers to exercise "[plarticular care ... when dealing with
lawful permanent residents, juveniles, and the immediate family members of
U.S. citizens." Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Secretary of ICE, to
at
available
30,
2010),
(June
ICE
Employees
All
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/civil enforcement-priorities
.pdf. In June 2012, the Obama Administration extended the Morton Memo's
prosecutorial discretion policy directive by sheltering about 880,000 young
people (would be DREAM Act applicants) from deportation and permitting
eligibility for a work permit. See Kevin Loria, DREAM Act stalled, Obama
halts deportationsfor young illegal immigrants,THE CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR,
June 15, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/0615/DREAMAct-stalled-Obama-halts-deportations-for-young-illegal-immigrants-video
(reporting that Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano stated that
while the policy will not grant any permanent immigration status, "young
people who were brought to the US through no fault of their own as children
and who meet certain criteria will be eligible to receive deferred action for a
period of 2 years and that period will be subject to renewal.").
207. INA § 237.
208. Loria, supra note 206 (quoting Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano).
209. INA § 101(a)(43); INA § 240A(a)(3).
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implemented either by Congress via statutory process, or by the
Administration via a policy directive.
B. Change Comes from Within (the Agency-U.S.C..S.)
While an explicit imputation rule would benefit individuals
who have already received their LPR status, but could potentially
be removed for filing the five- and seven-year requirements in LPR
CoR due to parental filing delays, this rule does nothing for
currently undocumented children of LPR parents. The rule would
only help them in the event they were in removal proceedings after
receiving their own LPR status. 2 10 To assist in "documenting" the
many undocumented children, some of whom are children of LPRs
and are thus eligible for LPR status as well, the Department of
Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 211
could level the playing field by extending the existing fee waiver
application. U.S.C.I.S. could permit an undocumented child of LPR
parentage to apply for fee waiver for the 1-130, Petition for Alien
Relative, and 1-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence
or Adjust Status, if the child is able to demonstrate inability of the
parents to pay2 12 the requisite fees 213 and the child would meet the
imputation rule or definition if the child was a LPR adult. This
second criteria, tying the fee waiver eligibility to the suggested
imputation rule, would ensure that children eligible for the fee
waiver must be physically present in the U.S. living with their
LPR parent at time of application and when the parent had
received his or her LPR status. 214 Children who are living abroad
with other relatives, living in the U.S. with other non-custodial
relatives, or otherwise unable to prove that they were living with
their LPR parent in the U.S. at the time the parent received the
210. The imputation rule does not benefit an individual who is not a LPR,
because the rule only provides for modifications to the start date and does not
confer any status the individual did not already have. If the individual is not a
LPR, then he must apply for non-LPR CoR, for which this specific imputation
rule is inapplicable. It is arguable that no imputation rule should be allowed
for non-LPR CoR, since to permit imputation there would be akin to
permitting imputation in TPS cases (which is not done), and would result in
the conferring of immigration status on the individual.
211. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (U.S.C.I.S.) is the agency
office responsible for immigration benefits.
212. Form 1-912, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/ (click on "Forms", then "Request for Fee Waiver"); Form
I-912P, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/
(click on "Forms", then "HHS Poverty Guidelines for Fee Waiver Request").
213. As of June 2012, the filing fee for the 1-130 is $420, and the filing fee
for the 1-485 is $985, plus $85 for biometrics. See Forms, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/ (discussing fees) (click on
"Forms"). If the beneficiary is under the age of 14, there is no biometrics fee.
Id.
214. Similar to Carlos, but unlike Damien.

The John MarshallLaw Review

1022

[45:991

green card 215 would all be ineligible for the fee waiver. Allowing a
fee waiver for the adjustment of status to LPR process is not
unheard of. The agency already allows a fee waiver for Special
Immigrant Juveniles (children who are in the U.S. and deemed to
be orphans) and VAWA 2 16 applicants, among others. 217 Providing a
fee waiver in this circumstance is not only consistent with the
current policies favoring undocumented children, but also
encourages commitment to U.S. society and permanency and
disclosure of physical presence in the U.S. (decreasing the
undocumented population).
X. CONCLUsIoN

After the U.S. Supreme Court's resolution of the imputation
question

in

Martinez

Gutierrez

and

Sawyers,

present

undocumented children and LPR adults who were undocumented
as children face one more obstacle. It is now up to lawmakers to
explicitly provide for imputation of parental time in residence and
date of LPR admission, which will reinstate the full extent of
CoR's intended effect as a means of relief for individuals with
substantial ties to the U.S.

215. This last category would discourage LPRs from bringing in
undocumented children after receiving the green card solely for the purpose of
avoiding the filing fees.
216. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13925-14045D
(2010).
217. See Fee Waiver Guidance,U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/ (discussing fee waivers) (click on "Forms", then "Fee
Waiver Guidance" under "Fees" in right column). There is also no fee for the I485 if the applicant is admitted to the U.S. as a refugee, but this is different
from a fee waiver. Id.

